SOME NEW BOOKS. ry of Cape Colony From

latest book on a timely and an interestet is B itain's Title in South Africa Story of Cape Colony to the Days of Trek. by JAMES CAPPON, professor the Queen's University, Kingston, Canada The purpose of this narrative examine the character of British rule th Africa from the beginning. Oby, the moral right which Briton or or may claim to control the future of that m must depend to a large extent, if not ly, on the work he has done in the and the title it has earned for him to ue that work in the future. The constill pending involves the destiny of all h Africa and will determine the kind of sation under which its mixed population, British and colored, are to live. This indubitable fact. Prof. Cappon subthat no superficial question of the tech rights of a suzerain or of the name of should be allowed to disguise the al nature of the struggle or excuse any one n examining the record of both parties re pronouncing judgment with regard what is only the latest phase of a conflict is more than a hundred years old.

is well known that what has hitherto on generally recognized as the standard tory of South Africa is a work in five volby George M. Theal of the Cape Colonial ervice. From this book the reader res a painful impression of misrule and ity and even of arrogance and tyranny part of the British Government. Prof. n does not believe that this impression led by the facts. He holds that Dr I far from being a safe guide, has labored arken the British side of South African Ty, has passed lightly of in silence over ristic merits of British rule, has stood or misrepresented its highest tions, has unfairly emphasized its de de as little as possible of the mic and industrial advantages which doubtedly conferred on South Africa. The aim of this volume is to show that the se of events given by Dr. Theal are in real to be received with great caution reader will, of course, understand that of the later phases of South African ory is considered in detail by Prof whose narrative ends in 1830, when what is known as the Great Trek was com

I.

What made the trekking Boer unwilling hat the Government, under which he had lived since the British occupation and under oh the mass of his countrymen continued to live in the Cape Colony, should follow him into the unsettled regions northward and eastward which he penetrated? Prof. Cappon ers that the first and most evident reason his unwillingness was that the Govern ment was felt to be alien in blood and speed ugh nearly allied in both. The frontier er knew nothing of the condition of Europe. He did not even know, as was afterward seen in Natal, that Holland had ceased to count ong the important Powers and that, in quence, the Cape, without British proection, would have been at the mercy of any Power that had 6,000 soldiers to spare for the purpose of securing the most important naval tation on the route to the East. Even the Transvaal Boer of to-day knows too little of the world to realize that, until the capitalists of the Rand poured wealth into the coffe of his Government, and enabled it to buy war material and organize itself on the scale of a great military Power, the British Government with its ring of colonies and its sphere of inluence was his only effective bulwark against sign interference and international com-ations. Unquestionably, the difference of blood and speech was one of the reasons for the Great Trek, and it seems to our author the only legitimate reason for the trekking Boer's anxiety to cut himself loose from British rule and to erect a State of his own South Africa. A second reason suggested is that the pastoral Boer, owing to his rude way of life, disliked any form of civilized nt which called upon the individual to pay taxes, accept restrictions and conform to a fixed standard of conduct for the general welfare. He thought he could get on without it. A semi-military organization of commandos seemed to him all that was needful.

At the time of the Great Trek (1886-1889), the necessity of securing a Hinterland from foreign encroachment was not so clear, as it is now, and the Government of Cape Colony did nothing to check the migration beyond protesting. Since that time the economic and commercial unity of South Africa below the Embesi has been distinctly recognized. The close political connection and interaction between all its States and communities, white and black, is as evident there as it is in the United States of America; for such political consolidation there is an indestructible busis in the geographical unity which connects the plateaux of the Interior with the coast lands and ports of Cape Colony and Natal The Commonwealth, moreover, into which the Transvaal Boer refuses to be incorporated, is no longer, as it was in 1836-1830, an autocratically governed colony. On the contrary, it is a self-governing community under the protection, it is true, of Great Britain, but of mixed blood and traditions, dual in language, and preponderantly Afrikander nationality. Under the present conditions the Boer's ambitions represent at the very least a dangerous element of sectionalism and have become a serious menace to the peaceful development of South Africa. The Boer ultimately saw that the natural laws of sconomic progress were against him, and he strove to stop their free play, until his Government became, as regards the other elements of the Transvaal's population, a tyranny. has shown that he would without hesita-Mon have imposed his rule on the British colony of Natal. Consequently, Prof. Cappon holds that it was no longer possible to regard his ambitions as sacred, inasmuch as they had become incompatible with the rights and In our author's epinion, there was another

and less oreditable reason for the trekking Boer's anxiety to sever his connection with British Government and British civilieation. Generations of a half-lawless life amid slaves and native servants had made him regard himself as the born lord and taskmaster of the colored races in Africa. and his conduct, as such, had been just what, to use Olive Schreiner's comparison, the duct of slaveholders and an absolute aristocracy has always been in Rome and Chaldea and all over the world. From the time of Gen. Craig's remonstrance (1798-09) against the examination of slaves and natives torture, down to the Emandipation act. the British Government, British Magistrates and British missionaries had been engaged teaching the Boer to adopt another point of view, and, as regards the greater part of Cape Colony, not without some success Boer of the frontier, however, could not reconcile himself to the establishment of anything like legal equality between him d the natives, and, after the British immigration and the establishment of new jury laws in 1827, he found that legal equality between white man and black had become an offensive reality. It was not only in his race pride that the Boer suffered The change involved an economic loss to him. To get cheap labor had always been his prindipal object, and the only sure way to that end was to make labor compulsory, either means of slavery or by vagrancy laws sufficiently stringent to put the native under the power of the white man. The result of ritish Government's legislation, combined with the labors of British missionaries and the native settlements organized by m, had been to teach the Hottentots the advantages of independence, and, consequently, Hottentot labor was neither so or procurable on as easy terms as

the memory of the execution of at Slachter's Nek, or the inadequacy of the compensation for the emancipated slaves that was at the bottom of the trekking Boer's eagerness to out himself loose from the jurisdiction of the British Government. It was determination which that Government had shown to deal out equal justice between white man and black and to protect the latter against the oppression of the former. This. it is our author's conviction, continues to this day to be the fundamental diference between the standard of civilization estabished in South Africa by the British Government and that upheld by the Transvaal Boer. What are the rights of the natives, and by what methods should you deal with them Can the colored man be educated and ethically trained sufficiently to be placed on terms of legal equality, or must he be treated as one whose evidence and whose engagements are worth nothing, and who must be disciplined as the beast of the field is disciplined? On this question the voice of the missionaries was clear, and it found powerful expression in the work of Dr. John Philip. the superintendent of the London Mission ary Society. He pleaded that the colored man could be educated both morally and mentally, and that, consequently, the soone he was treated as a human being whose right are sacred the better. It was from this point of view that Dr. Philip opposed the free use of the reprisal system and the proposal for a vagrancy act.

Our author admits that Dr. Philip and his fellow missionaries may have been too eanguine regarding the time required to com plete the civilization of the native African use, among the Kaffirs and Hottentots they found many persons of high inteligence and capable of reaching modern refinements of thought and feeling, they argued that only a generation or two would be needed education and good treatment to raise the native races to a level with the whites. Prof. Cappon recognizes that the civilization of a race is determined, not by the capacities of some or even many exceptional individuals, nor by its ability, up to a certain point, for understanding a theorem in geometry, but its collective power to produce repres tive institutions, and to establish a public pinion concerning what is best in the abstract and to enforce that opinion in the form of a noral order over all the individuals composing a community. Such a collective ower which must always represent a general level of intelligence and morals, is but slowly evolved.

It is in the final chapter of his book that our author reviews swiftly the events which have followed the Great Trek. He reminds us that the conflict between the civilization of the Briton and that of the trekking Boer has had a long and varied history since 1836, and it has not quite ended yet, although the British flag flies over Pretoria. It is acknowledged that mistakes have been committed by the British Government, and Prof. Cappon thinks that the South African question has been perplexed by the tendency of the leaders of the Liberal party in Great Britain to evade and put aside, and even at times to lay down altogether, the responsibilities of the empire. If we look, however, at the present condition and conduct of the native tribes, it is manifestly the policy of Dr. John Philip and of the British Government, which has so far been justified by history rather than that of the trekking Boer. The latter's policy and babits, had they been free to develop unmodified by British influence, could only have ended in brutalizing all the races in South Africa, including his own. That is an aspect of the question which must be taken into account.

On the whole, then, our author submits that Great Britain's title in South Africa is not so defective as some good people are ready to suppose. It seems to him Theal in his standard history missed a great opportunity of explaining, alike to Britain and Boer, the different nature of their rights in South Africa, rights which are capable of adjustment when well understood on both The rights of the Boer are those of the first settler, the hardy pioneer, the founder of a unique civilization, which may yet come to be of value to the world, though at present the only outstanding types it has produced are the old Boer of the veldt, a hard-grained nonest bigot, sometimes deeply streaked with touches of savage craft and cunning, and the young Boer of the cities, whose conceit is at least as remarkable as are his hardihood and patriotism. On the other hand, in our author's judgment the rights of the Briton are not less valid. With much inferior claim as a settler he has been the moving spirit of progress in South Africa, the mediator between its various races and the educator of the native stocks; he has been the supporter of all liberal and enlightened ideas and at great expense of blood and treasure to himself has maintained there a standard of law and justice which is on a par with that of the most civilized countries in Europe. It is his presence alone which, so far as one can see, has kept South African civilization from developing into a tremendous slaveholding aristocracy, with social and political features as bad as are those of the Turkish Empire. Did Dr. Theal recognize that the Briton

had rights in South Africa as well as the Boer? One purpose of the book before us s to prove that the recognition was very imperfect. "The historiographer of Cape Colony and official literary man of the British Empire in that part of the world did not comprehend his task, or was unfaithful to it Perhaps the pressure of the party with which he ailied himself was too much for him, and spoiled what might have been one of the nost instructive histories of the nineteenth century." It seems that for a number of years Dr. Theal's collaborator in researches was Mr. F. W. Reitz, subsequently Secretary of the South African Republic. Our author is inclined to doubt whether any history in which Mr. Reitz had a hand would be a fair account of British rule in South Africa. At all events, the spirit in which Dr. Theal's narrative was composed constrained him to "avoid any thorough treatment of the great questions involved in the development of South Africa, the principles of civil and religious liberty, the management of the native races, the work of the missionaries history of the Dutch Reform Church, and the indifference with which it left the task of educating and disciplining the native races to Outlander missionary societies, chiefly British; and, in general, the results of British influence in Cape Colony, and the present condition of that community, as compared with the civilization of the Transvaal. Dr Theal has felt obliged to pass over these opics in silence, or with only a casual remark, apparently because he perceived that a full discussion of them would have set the history of the trekking Boer in a less

favorable light To Prof. Cappon one thing, at all events, seems sufficiently clear, namely, that Dr. Theal's book could not have been written inless something like an organized conspiracy, under the protection of the prelominant political party, had existed against the British name and British traditions in South Africa. As a matter of fact, these traditions had long been shared by many Cape Dutch families of the best class, who n the past have contributed much more to what is best in South African civilization than have the relatively wild settlers of the frontier. Owing to the British neglect however, these traditions now seem al nost to have died out among the Cape Dutch. The surrender after Majuba Hill was of itself enough to kill them. According to Prof. Cappon, their only custodian to-day in South Africa is the British element of the population. That element is the most progressive enterprising, and could hold its own under any ordinary economic and constihad been before. Prof. Cappon main-tains that it was not, as Boer writers assert, its ground, unadied, against the military

organization, the gold and the despotism of the Transvaal. "There should be no il-lusions now at any rate. The Transvaal has for twenty years been a centre from which British traditions and interests have been assailed with untiring perseverence, and by deep-laid and long-maturing schemes, which, but for the courage of Mr. Chamberlain would robably have been successful. You must kill Krurerism or abandon the British population of South Africa, the British farmers, shopkeepers and miners, to a system of Dutch terrorism." Prof. Cappon can see no other way of extinguishing Kragerism than by taking away the independence of the Transsuffered to remain independent. he says, "can you expect but to have the whole comedy acted over again, the Reits-Theal propaganda, the nominal conce and real evasions of franchise rights, the crafty terrorism, the huge and scientific ullitary preparations and the calling in of Albrechts, Leyds and a crowd of clever foreigners to conspire against you; followed course, by the old dispute about the rights of a suzerain State to interfere and protect itself, with half the Radical leaders at working hard to make it impossible for you anticipate or prevent anything; the whole to end in a tragedy as now, or possibly, the next time in a catas roube."

Our author argues that to leave the British clonists of Natal once again at the mercy of the Transvaal would be much the same thing as if Great Britain had abandoned the roung and scattered English communities on the Atlantic seaboard of the New World to struggle along against the bold and vast designs of the French Governors of Canada for making America a French continent Some people with a head for economics may say that Britain had a poor return for settling that matter by the conquest of Canada. I cannot think so. The presence of a great English-speaking people on the American continent, instead of a French or Dutchspeaking one, has been one of the latent factors in the maintenance and development of the British Empire, and in spite of the new Americanism, which is not quite so wild a thing as it looks to be, is so at this day." At any rate the lesson of South African history from 1795 to the present time is pronounced sufficiently clear. The lesson is that nothing is gained by shelving difficulties and responsibilities; they only accumulate with terrible interest.

We find a reference to President Krazer

in the author's floal paragraph. He thinks that the conspiracy against its name and henor might have gone on unchecked and even unnoticed by the British nation, which has great faith in freedom of speech and exhibits an exemplary equanimity in the face of hestile criticism, had it not been for the "Arrogance of one man, who was rash enough to trample openly, ostentatiously, and, perhaps, quite needlessly, for his chief design, on every principle of civil liberty and economic progress which the British nation has stood for in South Africa, and to end by throwing the gauntlet in its face." Paul Kruger is here depicted as a living link between the Boers of to-day and the wild Jan Bothas and Bezuydenhouts of the past He is a Boer of the Great Trek, a genuine son of the savage soil of Bruintjes with the flerce memories of the old Graafreinet frontier still living in his heart, fresher probably, than are the things of yesterday He is a man of another generation, more distant from the present than can be measured by the mere lapse of time. "Behind that grith visage live rude and stern conceptions of human life inherite! from men who knew Rarabe and Ndlacabe, and whose wagons were the first to enter the passes of the Kamr country. The distinctions and subtleties of modern civilization can be nothing to such a man; its watchwords humanity, progress, freedom of speech the whole creed of modern Liberalism with the Christian virtues at the head of it, are but slight figments covering the moral antinomies of a life less natural in his eyes than a cattle-lifting raid or the moonlight revels of a Kaffir kraal. His public proclamations eak of a triune god, but the god he really knows and worships is the old Hebrew god of battles, the exterminator of the heathen. What is modern civilization to him, with its characteristic agencies and exponents, the S. P. C. K., the great joint stock company with its machines on the Rand, the smart American journalist and his interviewing. Nothing but the buzzing of wasps about his ears; nothing but what Joubert, writing in sympathetic Bantu idiom to a native chief, called 'the stinky of the English.' All in modern civilization that he has any use for is comprised in its Creusots and Maxims." a word, Paul Kruger is presented as a unique figure for the nineteenth century to number among its remarkable rulers, a magnificent incarnation of the traditions of his race, which but for his personality would hardly have won so much consideration or even notice from the civilized peoples of Europe "The old lion (with much of and America. the fox in him) of the race of Bruintjes Hoogte oust be content with having secured a place in history for the traditions of the trekking Boer. That is, perhaps, as much as they deserve, for they are not altogether of a kind to be a light to the path of civilization in South Africa, or to merit perpetuation in its insti-

III. Before taking leave of this book, we should ecall what the condition of the slaves and of the native Hottentots was in Cape Colony before emancipation. The subject will be found discussed at length in the seventh chapter, which deals with the state of things that confronted the British Government after its second occupation of the Dutch settlements in January, 1808. At this time the Boers constituted a rude aristocracy living on a basis of slavery and cheap native labor. In England, on the other hand, civflization was at this period making rapid advances along the line of humanitarian ideas. In 1807, after many years of agitation, the law abolishing the transmarine trade in slaves was passed by the British Parliament, and there was also a strong movement in favor of legislation to protect slaves and native servants in the British colonies from the violence of injustice of their masters among the Kaffr tribes, the character and A conflict was inevitable between standards of civilization so different as were those of the British nation and that of the Boer. conflict was no less unavoidable than was that which afterward broke out between the Northern and Southern States of America. Here it should be noted that the slaves In Cape Colony were mainly of three classes. to wit: the negro of Madagascar or Mozamblque, the Malay, and the Afrikander, the last-named term being then used to designate the offspring of a Cape Dutchman and a slave girl. The first class was the least valuable, and was generally used for nferior work, such as cutting timber and laboring in the fields. The Malays were a class of slaves, much employed in handicrafts, as carpenters, painters, &c., and generally bringing in a regular revenue to their masters. The Afrikander slave was the most coveted and especially in request for domestic service and confidential employment. The women of this class in particular were clever, often dressed well and were sometimes treated by their mistresses more like companions than slaves. Prof. Cappon concedes it to be true, as Dr. Theal asserts, that in no country on earth was the lot of the slave, upon the whole, so light as in South Africa. The great majority of the slaves were held in Cape Town and the neighboring districts and, after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, their value as property soon became too great to allow of their being ill-treated, or even unduly exposed. the country slaves, however, who worked in the fields were, as a rule, coarsely fed and

they were often overworked. Even their

condition was better than that of the slaves

sugar plantations of the West Indies. ourse, all slaves were subject to many and serious disabilities. Marriage was permitted to none of them, although they had quasi-matrimonial relations among themselves which the better class of slaves consid

As lately as 1822 many Dutch masters were still stubbornly opposed to the education of slaves, or to their instruction in the Christian religion, and considered it superfluous to teach them anything but the sixth and eighth commandments. They might be sold away from their families; this, indeed, was likely to happen if their owner died. When they became old and worn out they were apt to be starved and neglected, however faithful they night have been. The laws, as administered. afforded them but a feeble protection from the passions or the avarice of a brutal master Our author quotes a passage from Olive Schreiner's "Stray Thoughts About South Africa," in which she hints at dark domestic tragedies which, probably, were not infrequent in earlier times. "Old white men and romen," writes Olive Schreiner, "are still living in South Africa who can remember how, in their early days, they saw mea with guns out in the beautiful woods at Newlands, hunting runaway slaves. They can tell what a mistress once did when a slave became pregnant by her master; there are stories about hot ovens. Such stories as the story of Dirk, whose master seduced his wife and Dirk bitterly resented it. 'And one day, says the narrator, we children saw Dirk taken across the yard into the wine house; we heard he was to be flogged. For some days after we fancied we heard noises in the cellar; one night in the monlight we heard something, and got up and leoked out, and we saw something slipped across the yard by three men. We children dared say nothing, because my grandfather never let any one remark about the slaves; but we were sure it was Dirk's body." When one consider that in those days, according to the same authority, out of every four children born to a slave mother three were the children of the white man who was her master, one can easily understand that in the household of the Boer, living far from society or immediate control of any kind; tragic scenes were not uncommon. Oilve Schreiner, to be sure reminds us that there is nothing new in such tragedies. "It is all as old at the time of the Romans and Chaldeans," she says, and she idds: "To be surprised at it is folly; to imply that it is peculiar to South Africa and the outcome of the abnormal structure of the Boer communities is a lie." Prof. Cappon acknowledges that this is true enough, but be submits that in the second decade of the nineteenth century such a state of things was sure to breed disagreements between the Boers and the representatives of a country where Clarksons and Wilberforces were a

According to the author of this book, the condition of the Hottentot race within the colony was in general scarcely better than that of the slaves, and in some respects it seems to have been worse. The Hottentots were the original inhabitants of the southern corner of Africa, and at the time of Van Riebeek's settlement at the Cape (1652), were found there in numerous tribes and clans, the names of which have long passed out of memory. They seem to have lived in ease on the produce of their flocks and herds, and hough quarrelling occasionally over pasturage were, on the whole, like their later representatives, a people of mild and indolent disposition, possessing neither the characteristic energy nor the ferocity, of many other savage, races. The tribal organization, of the Hottentote was weak, their chiefs having but little authority and no cohesion existing among the different clans. Consequently the colonists, helped, perhaps, by two great plagues of smallpox which broke out among the Hottentots (1713 and 1755), found little difficulty in dispossessing the latter of their ancient pasture lands, and by the middle of the eighteenth century, the territorial possession of the country by the Hottentots was reduced to a few kraals, occupying inferior tracts that had been passed over by the Boers. The great majority of the race pendents on the Dutch settlers, and filled their farmsteads with an abject train of herdsmen and servants, fed on cheap flesh and remunerated at the end of the year with a present of tobacco, and, perhaps, a couple of sheep. The system of enforced apprenticeship of Hottentot children, born on Boer farms, operated to keep whole families in

The treatment of the Hottentots varied, of course, with the temper of their masters. To be tied up to a wagon wheel and flogged with the heavy siambok, while the Boer smoked one pipe or two or three pipes, according to his judgment of the gravity of the misdemeanor, or to receive a charge of small shot in the legs, seems to have been no uncommon degree of punishment for an angry Boer to inflict upon his Hottentot servant. For the worst forms of torture to which brutal masters might have recourse. the reader is referred to Barrow, Kay and other writers. It is conceded that the average Boer may have been, in his ordinary mood, no more cruel than the average Briton or Frenchman, but the opinion is here expressed that he was certainly rougher n his treatment of natives and animals in his service and less apt to flinch at the sight of their sufferings. To plunge knives into the flanks of wagon oxen, as a means of urging them forward, seems to have been one of the Boer practices when on a journey We are cautioned, however, to the rude conditions under which the Boer lived, the daily slaughter or waste of life, human and animal, which went on before his eyes, making him less sensitive to the sight of pain and anguish, which would ap-

pear shocking to a more civilized race. It is true that the Hottentot could nominally obtain redress from the law, if he could reach it, and if he could prove his case. But how, asks our author, was a Hottentot herdsman on a frontier farm to lay his complaint? He had to travel perhaps a hundred or two hundred miles to reach the nearest droatdy. hiding by day in swamps or caverns, and travelling only at night, in order not to be retaken and summarily shot as a runaway. If he did reach the drostdy and stated his case, he was at once sent to the prison for blacks to walt there till his master might appear, and then he was brought out to face board of hermraden, who were themselves farmers and probably shared the prevalent indifference and contempt for the sufferings of a colored man. If cases of cruelty and ppression were frequent, even under

British rule, and almost under the eye of the missionary, what must have been the state of things when the Government was weak and where a missionary had never penetrated? The condition of the slaves and Hottentots in the Cape Colony was one of the first things to call for attention on the part of the British Governor after the southern corner of Africa became a permanent part of the empire Evidently the kind of legislation required at the time was that which could define more strictly the rights of inferior races and extend to them a better protection from the laws without too much disturbing the economic condition of the country. Legislation of this kind, however, was a vexation to the Boer, especially to the Boer of the remoter districts. who was accustomed to look on everything, man and beast alike, within his six miles of farm land with the eye of an absolute lord and master. He had the strictest notion of the discipline necessary for slaves and fo servants of an inferior race. The concurrent testimony of all missionaries and travelers in South Africa proves that the Boers, as a rule, were decidedly hostile to the instruction of Hottentot servants as well as slaves in the Christian religion. Besides their unwillingness to admit the common humanity of the colored races there seems to have existed among them a vague notion, founded on of the earliest settlers, that baptized

slaves and natives had; a kind of legal status Interest in the pure Hottentot race is now, of course, mainly historical. Its place in South Africa has been taken by mixed breeds, especially the Cape-boys and Bastaris or Griques, the latter a stronger race, the product mainly of Cape Dutchmen and Hottentot women.

The Financial and Industrial History of the

We are indebted to Mr. JOHN CHRISTOPHER SCHWAB, professor of political economy in Yale University, for a volume entitled The Confederate States of America (Scribners). This is a financial and industrial history of the South during the Civil War. The finances and industries of the North during the contest have often been made the subject of careful investigation; the study of the Confederacy from the same point of view has herefore been neglected, owing to the paucity of trustworthy material. Contemporary records were comparatively rare. Imperfect means of communication prevented newsthentic information. The memory, also of surviving Southerners, especially of those who, at the time, were in position of authority. has been mainly occupied in recalling the military events of the war. Mr. Schwab's book is based on an inspection of all the accessible material. This consists of the published and unpublished records of the Confederate Government, especially the correspondence of the various executive departments in Richmond and the proceedings of the Confederate Congress. To these should be added the extant evidences of the action of the individual State Governments. For knowledge of current events in the legislative assemblies, as well as in the markets. the author has consulted the files of news papers, especially of those issued in Richmond, Charleston and other large centres of population. The gape in the information thus acquired have been filled to a certain extent by memoirs, diaries, biographies and similar publications.

Mr. Schwab leaves untouched the ques tion how much of the South's industrial weakness, as compared with the North, was due to the adoption and perpetuation of the slavery regime, and the consequent discouragement of a more advanced and industrial organization. It is well known that the wealth of the South consisted chiefly of land and slaves, and that its industries, were almost exclusively agricultural. Mines and manufactures hardly existed. Its means of transportation were far behind those of the North, and its cities, with the exception of New Orleans, Mobile and Charleston, were of comparatively slight importance as trade centres. The States against which the South waged war comprised, roughly speaking, two-thirds of the Union's population The North was industrially more advanced, its manufactures were vastly more exten sive, its urban population was more numerous, its trade much greater, its transportation system more highly developed-in a word, its resources were far superior to those of the South, and were the fundamental cause of the final overthrow of the Confederate Government.

I.

The author's conclusions with regar to the wisdom of the financial course pursued by the Confederate Government will be found summed up in the closing pages of the volume, but, before marking what he has to say upon the principal subject of his work, we would direct attention to a chapter in which the industries of the South are examined in detail. We have said that the development of mining and manufacturcomparatively meagre before the war. Nevertheless, the accessity of finding a domestic source of supply in the case of com modities which had formerly come from the North or from abroad, but I were temporarily cut off by the blockade, led to the establishment of various manufactures. Strenuous efforts, for example, were made to satisfy the need of salt. At first the Confederates had recourse to the evaporation of sea water, but, as the Federal control of the coast line gradually put difficulties in the way, the interior was searched for workable salt deposits. The State Governments offered rewards for the discovery of sait springs and a bonus for the production of salt; in some instances they subscribed to the capital of private salt-manufacturing companies, as they had been urged to do by the Continental Congress during the Revolution. Minor salt works were established in Texas, Alabama and Louisiana, North Carolina appointed a Salt Commissioner to establish works at Morehead City. These were destroyed by the Federal troops. Then works were built near Wilmington and operated for two years. South Carolina sought to remedy the scarcity of salt and the extertionate price demanded for it by contracting with private manufacturers for a supply of the article, which was then sold to consumers, presumably below the price paid by the State. Alabama made a similar arrangement. The leading source of supply was in the southwest corner of Virginia, especially at Saltville, where the daily output of salt rose to about seven thousand bushels before the end of 1862. These works remained in operation till 1865, and were not disturbed by the Federal troops until the last days of 1884.

At the outbreak of the war the South contained a good many tanneries, and these received additions. Factories for turning out shoes and saddles were established here and there. In 1862 the Government started a shoe factory of its own in Richmond, but no machinery was supplied; the shoes were made by hand by soldiers detailed for the purpose. A similar factory was organized in Montgomery at a later date. The collective capacity of these factories was at most 1,000 pairs of shoes a day. In 1861 textile manufactures can scarcely be said to have existed in the South. Cotton mills, however, were soon established, especially in Georgia, South Carolina and Alabama. These produced no inconsiderable amount of cotton cloth, and were encouraged by subsidies from the State Governments, as well as by the Confederate Government, which imported suitable machinery from abroad. A few paper factories turned out a material of coarse quality, but the chief supply of paper came from the stock carried over from before the war. Of other kinds of industries started, we hear of the manufacture of hats, blankets, hosiery, candles, printers' ink, lampblack, glass, matches, pottery and eyen of cutlery, copperas, woollens, tinware, silverplate, stoves, oil cloths, planos and sewing machines. It is doubtful, however, whether any of these last-named industries got beyond the experimental stage. The necessary machinery and skilled labor were wanting. Our author is convinced that the few, who succeeded in securing a sufficient amount of capital and skilled labor to establish permanent manufactories must have made large profits. According to Pollard, the contractors who supplied the Government with war material had become rich and prosperous by 1864. The only direct evidence which Mr. Schwab can find upon the subject is furnished by the Virginia tax assessment for the year 1863. By this assessment for the year 1863. Conditions of the contractors who supplied the Government with war material had become rich and prosperous by 1864. The only direct evidence which Mr. Schwab can find upon the subject is furnished by the Virginia tax assessment for the year 1863. By this assessment for the year 1863. By this assessment for the year 1863. One of the war. Of these factories there was not not not year the outbreak of the contest; in part from the Southern factory alone was assessed for profits of the distributions of war. The Southern factory alone was assessed for profits of the distribution of factory alone was assessed for profits of the contest of facts, small arms were not manufactured, and that most of the equipment of facts, small arms were not manufactured and that most of the equipment of the profits of the p chinery from abroad. A few paper factories turned out a material of coarse quality, but

and of excellent quality. There was a good grain and sugar harvest, but a falling off in the tobacco crop. In the following year the reports were not so favorable, though in parts of Georgia the corn crop was pienti-ful. Little rice was raised, because the Federal troops soon overran the coast. In any event, there could not have been any searcity of food products, for the reason that cotton was largely displaced by wheat, corn and fodder. In South Carolina the planters were said to have doubled their corn acreage. In 1863 the substitution of food products for cotton continued. We hear of large corn crops and of especially large wheat crops, except in Virginia, where there were compainints of scaroity, which, however, on closer analysis, were found to be due, not to small harvests, but to the unwillingness of the farmers to send their produce to Richmond, lest it should be impressed at unremunerative prices. In August, 1863, the receipts of wheat in Richmond fell to 75,000 bush's; there had been 700,000 during the same month in preceding years. In 1864 the corn harvest was unusually abundant in most of the States, but the production of wheat is said to have declined, except in Virginia; in March, 1875, the condition of the crops was reported as exceptionally favorable in the States south of Virginia.

From these facts the deduction is drawn by Mr. Schwab that, whatever scarcity of food may have been felt in the armies and in the cities, was due not to deficient harveste, but to the difficulty of attracting harveste, but to the difficulty of attracting harveste to the markels under the currency and impressment regime. The destruction of food may have been felt in the armies and in the changes and reductions in the soldiers rations—was much more than counterbalanced by the increased attention given by the Southern bianters to raising grain and corn to the exclusion of ection.

Popular appeal and legislation discouraged the raising of cotton. The result was that the amount of this staple grown in the Southern balance to raising grain and corn to the exclusion of ection.

Popular appeal and legislation discouraged the major and less of more than 4½ millions of bales; the figure for 186; fell below 6 millions in 1862 only one million bales. Cotton was accumulated in la

try, a proceeding which led to diffic with the States. On one occasion the ernor of Georgia proposed to prosecute one distilling in the State, even though should be an agent of the Confederate ernment, or a contractor for it. Mr. Schools that the quantity of whiskey disby the Confederate Government, or be contractors, was enormous.

The railroad industry receives more than eassing notice at our author's hands. In the development of railways the South had fagged far behind the North: It is also certain that the railroads of the North were better built and equipped, and were more efficiently operated There were no trunk lines in the South; such railways as existed were mainly local roads, facilitating local traffic from and to the important coastwise cities like Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New orleans and, of course, Richmond and Petersburg. To the total railroad mileage of the United States of the Confederacy contributed 9.283, or less than 30 per cent. This figure was soon reduced by Federal inroads to something over 5.000, or, in round numbers, one-fifth of the country's aggregate railroad mileage. country's aggregate railroad The Southern railroads were taxed to their utmost capacity to keep the centres whence they radiated as well as the armies collected there, provisioned. From Richmond and there, provisioned. From Richmond and Petersburg two lines tapped the food-producing regions; first the South Side Railway, which ran westward to the corner of Virginia whence the alt came, and into Tennessee second, the Richmond and Danville Railway, which ran in a southwesterly direction, and was extended during the war to join the North Carolina Railroad at Greensboro. In the State last named the railroads radiated from Wilmington, and were of great usefulness in distributing the blockade goods. One line led northward to Goldsboro and Dalton to Richmond; the other led westward to South Carolina, where it joined the network that centred at Charleston. One of the Charleston lines ran from that city to Augusta through Atlanta, and thence northward to Chatta 100ga. A parallel line ran from Savannah to Macon, and at Atlanta joined the former road. The remaining railways in the South were either unimportant bran ches and disconnected links, or they were at least partly in the hands of the Federal troops. The latter was especially true of the long line running eastward from Memphis.

Not only was there an immense destruction of railway materials along the line of the Federal advances, but the roads deteriorated rapidly and could not be kept in repair. Their capacity for handling freight was much reduced, in 1863 there were only a few railroads that ran more than two trains a day. Bridges and rolling stock wore out and could not be replaced. By the end of the war the railroads were reduced to a condition from which it took them many years to recover. The North Carolina Railway, for instance, had there, provisioned. From Richmond and Petersburg two lines tapped the food-pro-ducing regions; first the South Side Railway,

replaced. By the end of the war the railroads were reduced to a condition from which it took them many years to recover. The North Carolina Railway, for instance, had only five serviceable passenger cars left, and other lines were no better off. It appears that the railroads did not make due allowance for deterioration, but figured out large profits on their business during the war. The carrying of troops and army supplies superseded the carrying of cotton, which, of course, greatly dwindled in the case of the South Carolina Railway, for example, from over 300,000 bales in 1800 to 120,000 in 1801 and to an annual average of 28,000 during 1802-4. The gross receipts of this road, however, increased four-fold between 1830 and 1884, and the net receipts more than doubled, leading to an increase of the dividends from 7 per cent, to 16 per cent. The records of the Georgia Railroad give similar figures, as do also the lines leading out of Richmond, which did a large business on Government account. Mr. Schwab says that there is good evidence that the railroad sought to increase their profits by speculating in cotton, which they, of course, had excellent opportunities to buy and to store along their lines. That the profits of the railways were resented may be inferred from the fact that a bill was introduced in the Confederate Senate to compel the roads to reduce their charges when their

factory alone was assessed for profits of \$335,000. A woollen mill is reported to have declared dividends of \$530,000 on a capital of \$200,000: a paper mill paid dividends to the amount of \$75 per cent, upon the capital in the years 1861 and 1862; the dividends of another manufactory were equivalent to 615 per cent, upon the capital invested.

Concerning the condition of the agricultural industries in the South during the war. Mr. Schwab has been able to obtain but little authentic, information. In 1861 the newspapers resorted that the crops were abundant

ated. We hear of plans to establish smelting works and of some rolling mills, but fuel and ore were too scarce to come into general use, though iron mines in South Carolina and coal mines in Alabama and North Carolina are mentioned. Nails were about the only article of iron, other than war materials, produced during the war materials, produced during the Pactories for the manufacture of percussion caps and cartridges were established at various places; there was, for instance, one in Augusta which, presumably, was the largest.

one in Augusta which, presumably, was the largest.

The authorities were chiefly busied in providing a sufficient supply of gunpowder. At the outset of the contest the Secretary of War reported that no powder factories were known to exist in the Confederacy. By the autumn of 1861 numerous powder manufacturing companies were incorporated in South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee and other States. Abandoned or neglected saltpetre mines were worked again, one of them by the same man who had operated it in the War of 1812. In the spring of 1862 the Government made strenuous efforts to increase the supply of saltpetre by offering a high price for it, and by offering to advance half the capital needed to erect nitre works, or to enlarge the existing establishments. The quantities produced by private manufacturers, proved the manufacturers. vance half the capital needed to erect nitre works, or to enlarge the existing establishments. The quantities produced by private manufacturers proved insufficient, and in April, 1822, a special Government bureau was created to furnish the armies with powder. This "Nitre and Mining Bureau" at once set about to discover pitre mines, and by Aug 1 had nearly 400 men at work in sixteen caves. By October 200,000 pounds of saltpetra had been produced, to which were added imports from Mexico and from Europe; these imports exceeded the home production. The porte from Mexico and from Europe; these imports exceeded the home production. The principal Government factories were at Augusta and San Antonio; the former was chiefly relied upon by the Government, during the year ending July, 1863, it supplied 1,009,090 pounds, and, presumably, remained in operation till the capture of Augusta.

During the War of the Rebellion, as due ing the Revolutionary War, the instinct of trade conflicted with the instinct of patriotism. The trade carried on with the enemy was demoralizing in its effect upon the communitles near the border line between the North and South. The soldiers could not reconcile their military duties with the commercial practices they saw about them. which were connived at, if not directly authorized and instigated by their superiors. Mr. Schwab tells us that there were not wanting those who asserted that the military offcers were personally the gainers by such commerce. There was, it seems, a difference of opinion as to the effect and the desirability of the trade with the enemy. Many at the time not only pointed out the demoralization it caused, but went so far as to maintain that the trade enriched the North and impoverished the South. "It would be better," said the Richmond Examiner, "for our Government to blockade its own ports than that its traffic with the enemy should be continued." Others thought that the poople on the border should be encouraged to trade with the enemy in order to obtain food, clothing and arms on the most at-

food, clothing and arms on the most alvantageous terms; their theory was that, under the becullar conditions, such a trailiwas beneficial to the Confederacy, and should
be regulated, but not hampered. Still others
urged that the profits from the trade should
be monopolized by the Government.

These divergent opinions were reflected
in the vaciliating solicy pursued by the civil
and military authorities. Gen Pemberton
freemently reported to the War Department
that the illicit traffic could not be stopped in
Mississippi and urged a policy of tacit noninterference. This policy was presumable
adopted, for we hear of a lively trade springing up in that section, which was distinctly
recognized. If not authorized by the Richmond authorities, Gen Polk also favored
licensing the illicit commerce, and gave passes
to merchants to carry cotton to Vicksburg
and bring back supplies. In a confidential
letter he advised Gen. W. Adams to "see
that Yankees get cutton now and then, but
not faster than suits our purpose." The transfor of a large amount of cotton into the Federal
lines followed, and aroused much opposition
to the traffic. Mr. Schwab binks that the
practice of permitting it was not generally
divulged for fear of exciting popular feeling to the tradic. Mr Schwab tunks that the neactice of pormitting it was not generall divulged for fear of exciting popular feelin against it. Cen. Lee, though recognizing the demoralizing effect of such trade allowed to make the urged the Secretary of Watto make the tradic as productive as possible presumably, by having the Government presumably by having the Governmenopolize it, but a fortnight later he advi

in both cases it was employed as an adjunct military conrations, and in so far as it we flective in the case of the Confederal whother as a result of the Federal blocks or of Confederate legislation, it weaker the country for waging war by shutting foreign supplies. In both cases the problem of trade between the belliggrents we will be a federal trade between the belliggrents we military in the freign supplies In both cases the prohibition of trade between the belligerents was evaded to a marked extent; the military motive of mutual destruction could not fully repress the economic motive of mutual gain by trade.

As we have said, the author's view of the effect of the Confederacy's financial policy is summed up in his closing pages. Here it is pointed out that the war, by its pressure from without and its coercive measures from within, wrecked the industrial organization of the South: aside from the emand-pation of the slaves, an after effect of the war which does not come within the purview of Prof. Cappon's studies. The blockade the most effective military weapon of the Northforced upon the South an economic isolation which deprived her of all the advantages which modern international trade and credit relations might otherwise have offered. and compelled her to revert to earlier indutrial forms. This reversion was the more disastrous to the South owing to the backwardness of her industrial development in comparison with the North, which backwardness was largely the outrime of the institution of slavery. The blockade, acting in conjunction with the inflated currence deranged prices and inevitably led to violent speculation, which contributed to the social and political disintegration that characterized the South during the period of secassion.

The social disorder was a natural reaction against the military despotism which itself was a necessary outgrowth of the war, but involved a flat contradiction of the fundamental notions embodied in the formation of a "Confederacy." Aside from the compulsory enrollment in the army, coercive measures were applied to carry out financial expedients, aimed at a forced transfer of capital from those who had it, the farmers, planters and capitalists—in a word, the producers—to the Government and the army, which consumed it unproductively. The effect of this wholesale destruction of capital we see in the impoverisament of the South, from which it is only slowly recovering, from which it is only slowly recovering, from which extrain sections will perhaps never recover. The capital of the South, represented by coin in circulation, was the first to go, at least so much as the early loans of the Confederate Government secured for its use. Trust funds and the investments of educational and similar institutions were quite generally turned into Government securities, and the capital they represented was swept away, as were more of the avenues of the community. The against the military despotism waich it said was a necessary outgrowth of the war.

investments of educational and similar institutions were quite generally turned into Government securities, and the capital they represented was swept away, as were most of the savings of the community. The accumulated wealth of the past was consumed and not replaced. Invested capital of even the most permanent character was worn out or destroyed.

Mr. Schwab holds that the methods employed by the Confederate Government to bring about this transfer of capital may be fairly criticised on the score of their ineffectiveness. Taxes were neglected, and the fixed policy which was adopted the dependence upon paper money issues immensely aggravated the difficulty of securing the necessary risplies for the army and weekened the social structure of the South, it is conceived, however, that the history of Europe, and especially that of the United States, indicates that no statesman could have devised means of carrying on the war without recourse to such arbitrary and disturbing fiscal devices. The forces of war inevitably throw those of normal industrial progress out of gear and put into operation correlve and socially deranging forces, the effects of which in the South are exhibited in this volume. In our author's opinion, the verdict passed upon the career of the Confederate States should not so much emphasize the mistaken financial policy of their Government as heighten our surprise that, in spite of that policy, the South maintained herself so long. The Southern cause eviked as much devoted loyalty as has been called forth by any cause in history and that cause was supported at a cost greater than that only was supported at a cost greater than that only one of the confederate States should not so much encodes far exceeded those of the Revolutionary particles. The former lost everything in their desperate effort to pretract the war and avoid its inevitable conclusion. Mr. Schwab recognizes that it is probably of little comfort to them now to read that something might have been saved from the wreak if the Confederate Go